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Abstract: 17 
Hunting of game animals needs to be regulated; either through the number of permits or the bag size 18 
allowed per hunter. Such regulations may, however, jeopardize hunter satisfaction, on which game 19 
managers depend. Consequently, finding the optimal hunting intensity is not straightforward. Using 20 
data from Norwegian grouse hunting, we show that an integrated approach combining sociology and 21 
bioeconomics can give markedly different priorities than an optimization based exclusively on 22 
bioeconomics. Three grouse hunter typologies with contrasting stated preferences regarding bag size 23 
and crowding were used to account for varying hunter behaviour. Omitting the social constructs from 24 
the model pushed the hunter density towards its upper limit, because the gain of selling one more 25 
permit generally superseded the loss in hunter satisfaction (expressed as willingness-to-pay). 26 
Although this strategy multiplied the overall profit, it produced a daily bag size that would be 27 
unacceptable to practically all hunters. We conclude that biosocioeconomic modelling is a valuable 28 
tool in the pursuit of sustainable game management. 29 
 30 
Key-words: bioeconomic, game, grouse, harvest, typology, willingness-to-pay 31 
 32 
1. Introduction 33 
Around the globe, populations of game species cause concern for being either overabundant (e.g., 34 
moose: Serrouya et al. 2011; deer: Warren 2011) or declining (e.g., grouse: Storch 2007; caribou: 35 
Wittmer et al. 2005). To decide on the right action, managers normally depend on the engagement and 36 
goodwill of hunters. While hunting regulations are instrumental in keeping game populations within 37 
sustainable frames, we also need satisfied hunters in order to maintain hunting as an activity of the 38 
future (Heberlein and Kuentzel 2002; Schroeder et al. 2006). Additionally, hunting revenues may 39 
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constitute a substantial part of rural economy (Sharp and Wollscheid 2009), and as such presents yet 40 
another reason for managers to take hunter satisfaction into account. 41 
Historically, hunter satisfaction has been commonly viewed as being linearly related to hunting 42 
success, i.e. the number of animals killed (Mechling 2004). However, already four decades ago it was 43 
established that hunter satisfaction is determined by far more complex elements than such a 44 
consumptive measure (Hendee 1974). Since then research on the topic has more or less taken this 45 
“multiple-satisfaction” approach to heart (e.g. Decker et al. 1980; Vaske et al. 1986; Hazel et al. 1990; 46 
Hayslette et al. 2001). Principally, the factors that determine hunter satisfaction are strongly linked to 47 
hunting motivation. What Decker and Connelly (1989) state about deer hunters, “...motivations for 48 
hunting deer are rooted in the areas of personal achievement, affiliation with friends and family, and 49 
appreciation of the outdoors” (p. 462) seems to hold for hunters in general. A motivation that is quite 50 
weak, is to hunt for non-personal gains to benefit other stakeholders or the wider community (e.g., 51 
Ward et al. 2008). Often this leads to a disagreement between hunters and managers over what 52 
constitutes optimal animal densities (Diefenbach et al. 1997; Horton and Craven 1997; Finch and 53 
Baxter 2007; Wam and Hofstad 2007).  54 
As a result, new harvest regulations must be carefully introduced in order not to critically reduce 55 
hunter satisfaction. Management agencies then need tools that can only be developed from truly 56 
interdisciplinary research, preferentially from all three relevant research fields; ecology, sociology and 57 
economics. Although ecological economics has come a long way towards interdisciplinary research 58 
(Söderbaum 2007; Wam 2010), the simultaneous integration of three such different research fields is 59 
still a rather novel approach. As has often been the case with interdisciplinary advances in natural 60 
resource management, fishery researchers are leading the way (Bunnefeld et al. 2011a). Pioneer 61 
biosocioeconomic models for the harvest of marine resources were presented several decades ago 62 
(e.g., Smith 1968; Krauthamer et al. 1987; Charles 1989), and in the last ten years inclusion of 63 
stakeholder behaviour has frequently been argued to be essential for successful fishery models (e.g., 64 
Mapstone et al. 2008; Fulton et al. 2011, Milner-Gulland 2011). Similar approaches in terrestrial 65 
systems seem to be lagging. 66 
In this study we made a socioeconomic survey of habits, attitudes and stated preferences among 67 
grouse hunters in Norway, and used the data in an integrated biosocioeconomic model to evaluate the 68 
optimal balancing of harvest regulations and hunter satisfaction. While our overall model objective 69 
was to maximize landowner profit, we also contrast this with alternative scenarios that more directly 70 
prioritize hunter satisfaction. We kept the model framework fairly simple, but its parameterization is 71 
based on extensive empirical data, with the aim of having a model that is “robust in the real world 72 
rather than optimal in the ideal world” (Milner-Gulland 2010, p. 1). While some general 73 
recommendations for game managers can be drawn from the study, our main goal is to illustrate how 74 
a stronger inclusion of social constructs can be a valuable expansion to the traditional tools used in the 75 
pursuit of sustainable game management.  76 
 77 
2. Materials and methods 78 
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2.1. Hunter satisfaction survey 79 
An e-mail invitation to participate in a web-based questionnaire was sent to all grouse hunters (N = 80 
8,129) registered with the two large public agencies “Norwegian State-owned Land and Forest 81 
Enterprise” and “The Finnmark Estate” (managing approximately 50% of Norwegian outfields). The 82 
questionnaire was available from 25/05/2010 to 01/10/2010, with a reminder e-mail sent 09/09/2010. 83 
Of the invitations sent, 256 bounced due to failed delivery and after eliminating 20 responses that 84 
were either blank, irrational or foreign, we were left with 3,107 respondents (response rate 40%). We 85 
also posted open survey invitations on various Norwegian hunting-related web-sites, and got an 86 
additional 186 respondents (an e-mail filter was used to avoid double participation). Because of the 87 
low sample size, and because descriptive statistics indicated that the responses did not deviate from 88 
those in the e-mail survey, all respondents have been pooled in this study. 89 
The questionnaire contained 26 main questions, of which 14 were attitudinal and 12 were purely 90 
descriptive asking for hunter habits and demographic data. The questions ranged from simple closed-91 
option tick boxes and balanced 5-point Likert scales to a majority of complex open-ended what-if-92 
scenarios. The latter was preferred for questions addressing willingness-to-pay as it has been 93 
extensively shown that the open-ended answering format may reduce response bias (e.g. Boyle et al. 94 
1985; Mitchell and Carson 1989; Pollicino and Maddison 2001). However, in some cases we were 95 
mainly interested in relative changes (e.g., when parameterizing the shape of the ctkl function in 96 
equation 5), and we then gave a starting value (outlining, e.g., a normal situation worth 1,000 NOK 97 
for a week’s hunting, and thereafter asking for willingness-to-pay for increased bag sizes). While this 98 
may have given some slight bias, we believe it is less of a negative influence than what could have 99 
occurred from a potentially very large spreading of data. Questions that we deemed particularly 100 
difficult were addressed twice in two different formats (reverse-keying). The survey questions are 101 
described in more detail in Wam et al. 2013. 102 
 103 
2.2. Hunter typology classification 104 
We classified the respondents into hunter typologies using latent class analyses (LCA), specifically 105 
the cluster analysis package available in Latent GOLD® (version 4.5, Windows XP) (Vermunt and 106 
Magidson 2005). Typologies were determined with regard to ‘importance of bag size’, which 107 
basically reflects their acceptance for a regulated game hunting (i.e. limiting the yield allowed per 108 
hunter, or controlling it indirectly through the number of hunters). To determine which LCA models 109 
that best (in terms of parsimony) captured the heterogeneity in the stated preferences of our 110 
respondents, we used likelihood-ratio goodness of fit in relation to the degrees of freedom, 111 
classification errors as well as BICLL values. The typology classification is described in more detail in 112 
Wam et al. (2012). 113 
 114 
2.3. Model framework 115 
Our biosocioeconomic model was developed for the planning of grouse hunting over a fixed period of 116 
time on a property with only one decision-maker. We thus assume that the property is large enough 117 
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for cross-border migration of grouse to be negligible. Consequently, we do not address property right 118 
issues related to such movement, which is generally not a prevalent issue for grouse in Scandinavia 119 
(dispersal of willow ptarmigan Lagopus lagopus, e.g., is approximately 400 m for adults and 4,200 m 120 
for juveniles, Brøseth et al. 2005). The basic management issue we are addressing is how to best 121 
allocate a given hunting quota between varying numbers of hunters, considering both landowner 122 
profit and hunter satisfaction. 123 
The model was built on a matrix framework reflecting different hunting zones, with added 124 
functions of density-dependency operating on the hunter satisfaction parameters (i.e. willingness-to-125 
pay indices). The grouse population projection was kept simple with set recruitment rates and the 126 
notion that hunting should not reduce next year’s density of adult birds (1 year and older). While this 127 
simple strategy omits essential biological dynamics, we believe a more complex model (including 128 
e.g., weather stochasticity, migration or innate population fluctuations) will mask the socioeconomic 129 
aspects that are of main interest here (see also discussion). 130 
In the model, the grouse population is projected at one-year intervals in a modified zone-version of 131 
the basic Leslie matrix (Leslie 1945), assuming discrete reproduction and mortality (natural and 132 
hunting). The number of individuals is counted after reproduction, immediately before the hunting 133 
season commence. No differentiation is made of sex and age of birds, as this to very little extent can 134 
be intentionally selected for by grouse hunters in a shooting situation (Hörnell-Willebrand et al. 2006; 135 
Bunnefeld et al. 2009, 2011b). The various hunting zones correspond to distinguishable bioeconomic 136 
units. They may be set to reflect basic differences in, for example, grouse productivity, infrastructure 137 
(roads and cabins), or terrain type (steepness and ruggedness). If Gtk is the number of grouse present 138 
in zone k at time t, then: 139 
 140 
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r
 is the vector of population zone structure (number of birds per zone k) at time t, 
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r
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 148 
where rij is the discrete recruitment rate (number of juveniles observed per adult). Although not 149 
included here, G  can easily be expanded to include movement of birds across zones, which may be 150 
relevant to other hunting regulations such as the use of refugee areas. Basically, what is available as 151 
hunting quotas (qtk) are rk · Gtk. Naturally, the number of shot birds can never exceed the hunting 152 
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quotas, and because we were not interested in temporal population effects in this study, we assume 153 
that the quotas are fully utilized (stk = qtk). However, as grouse hunting is more or less additive to 154 
other causes of death (Pedersen et al. 2004; Pöysä et al. 2004; Sandercock et al. 2011), the available 155 
quotas is delimited with a compensation factor: 156 
 157 
)( tktktk Grcq ⋅⋅= , c = [0, 1]  (3) 158 
 159 
Sale of hunting permits (including accommodation) is the only source of income in the model. The 160 
price obtained per permit can, however, be made quite complex through the zone framework. We 161 
may, for example, differentiate the zones to accommodate for various hunting packages, such as 162 
simple accommodation versus luxurious ‘full package deals’; local versus visiting hunters; or 163 
regulating the use of hunting dogs. However, as our main focus in this study is the basic dynamics of 164 
bag size, crowding effects and hunter satisfaction, we have kept example scenarios quite simple. The 165 
total net profit from grouse hunting (π) on the property throughout the planning period can be 166 
summarized as: 167 
 168 
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 170 
where ptkl is the willingness-to-pay of each hunter typology l for their total hunting days in a given 171 
zone, and htkl is the number of hunters of a given hunter typology that is actually hunting in the 172 
various zones (also termed the number of permits). The proportional distribution of hunter typologies 173 
is fixed and not a variable to be optimized. The number of hunters cannot exceed the number of 174 
harvestable grouse, or reach a density higher than 5 km-2 (see crowding tolerance, section 2.4 and 175 
Table 1). Operating costs for running the property is included with a fixed part (fct) that applies even 176 
when no permits are sold, and an elastic part (hctk) that depends on the number of hunters and in 177 
which zone they hunt. Because planning periods in grouse management generally are short (5-10 178 
years), we do not take into account discount factors and rate of interest.  179 
We want non-linearity added to our basic profit equation, in order to include more complex 180 
density-dependent relationships regarding the hunters’ willingness-to-pay. Of particular interest is the 181 
importance of bag size and the tolerance for crowding. For a given hunting quota, both the bag size 182 
and the crowding tolerance are determined by the number of permits sold. We therefore expand the 183 
price function ptkl in equation 4: 184 
 185 
tkltkltkltkltkl cbadp )( +⋅=  (5) 186 
 187 
where dtkl denotes the number of days each hunter normally hunts per season, atkl is what they on 188 
average spend on on-site accommodation (offered by and paid to the landowner), btkl is a function 189 
reflecting the hunters’ willingness-to-pay for the number of birds they bag per day, and ctkl is a 190 
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function reflecting the effect of crowding. Overall, the price function mimics a classic Beverton-Holt 191 
curve (Beverton and Holt 1957), so that the price obtained per sold permit approaches a lower limit 192 
when the number of hunters increases.  193 
Our survey data showed that not only the level but also the shape of btkl varied with hunter 194 
typology. We found that second-order polynomials best described this bag-dependent relationship for 195 
all three typologies (Table 2), so that: 196 
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 199 
where q/dh denotes the available quotas per hunter-day (birds per hunter per day), which depends on 200 
the number of permits that are sold at time t in a given zone k. Because very few, if any, hunters are 201 
likely to hunt with a hunting quota of zero, we have a minimum daily bag size (0.5 birds). Likewise, 202 
the daily bag size must have an upper limit, and for the purpose of this study it was set at 20 birds.  203 
In the function regulating the effect of crowding:  204 
 205 
l
ktklkltkl kmhoc
βα )/(1 2⋅⋅+= , ]5,0/ 2 =kmh , β > 0          (7) 206 
 207 
α and β are constants tailoring the negative effect that increased hunter density (h/km2) has on the 208 
hunters’ willingness-to-pay, while ok is a factor that corrects the hunter density for varying 209 
observability (not all hunter groups are actually seen by other hunters, see section 2.4). While a linear 210 
or second-order polynomial fitted the crowding function equally good (Table 2), it would involve 211 
unnecessarily complex transformation of data to be compatible with the aspired Beverton-Holt 212 
framework of the overall price function. 213 
 214 
2.4. Model parameterization 215 
Parameter values pertaining to the grouse transition matrix were determined from work on 216 
Scandinavian populations of willow ptarmigan: range of recruitment rates and hunter densities from 217 
Steen and Erikstad (1996) as well as Hörnell-Willebrand (2005), and range of mortality compensation 218 
factors (equation 3) from Sandercock et al. (2011). Range of property sizes and administrative costs 219 
were determined based on Andersen et al. (2010). The remaining parameter values (all related to 220 
equation 5) were obtained from the survey conducted in this study.  221 
In equation 5, two specific functions of willingness-to-pay needed to be parameterized: 1) the 222 
importance of bag size (btkl); and 2) the effect of crowding (ctkl). The two factors did not interact to 223 
have a cumulative effect on the relative change in the willingness-to-pay, i.e. the latter was 224 
consistently reduced by the same factor when increasing the density of observed hunters, whether the 225 
bag was considered satisfying or not (Table 1). We therefore maintain that the two factors could be 226 
parameterized separately, and subsequently combined in the full price function. 227 
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The bag function (btkl) could be straightforwardly parameterized from the survey data as we had 228 
asked the hunters directly about their willingness-to-pay for a bagged bird given three different yields 229 
(low, intermediate and high). The willingness-to-pay per bird was transformed to per day by simply 230 
multiplying it with the given bag size. The crowding function (ctkl) was more complicated to 231 
parameterize, because we had score indices for three levels of hunter density (low, intermediate, 232 
high), but pay data only for two levels (low, intermediate) (Table 1). As it turned out, the two sets 233 
showed the same relative change when going from low to intermediate hunter density. We therefore 234 
applied the relative change from intermediate to high in the score indices to the pay data (using 235 
individual observations, not averages).  236 
In the survey, crowding was addressed by stipulating hunter encounters (0-1, 4-6 and 10+ groups 237 
of hunters seen per day). When transforming these into hunter densities we assumed a terrain size of 238 
10 km2 (making 0.05, 0.50 and 1.00+ hunters seen per day and km2). The relationship between hunter 239 
densities and hunter encounters is likely to vary considerably from terrain to terrain. We estimated 240 
ours from 1) the empirical finding that Norwegian ptarmigan hunters walk an average of 16.2 km/day 241 
(Brøseth and Pedersen 2000); and 2) the assumption that average visibility in the terrain is 300 m 242 
(thus, the average hunter overlooking an area of 9.7 km2). Typical hunting intensities in Scandinavia 243 
are 1-4 hunting days/km2 (Hörnell-Willebrand 2005). Divided by the average number of ptarmigan 244 
hunting days for Norwegian grouse hunters (15 days per hunter per season, this study), these figures 245 
correspond to 0.07-0.27 hunters/km2 accumulated over the season. If all hunters hunt at the same time 246 
and are 100% observable to each other (no spatial or temporal distribution), hunter encounters per km2 247 
would correspond to the actual number of hunters per km2. However, that is normally not the case, 248 
and therefore we included an observability factor ok in equation 5 (section 2.3).  249 
All statistics pertaining to the model parameterization was carried out in R (version 2.14.2, The R 250 
Foundation for Statistical Computing). Central measures are mean ± 1 SE unless stated otherwise.  251 
 252 
2.5. Model optimization 253 
Non-linear numerical optimizations of the model were ran in GAMS (distribution 20.7 – Windows 254 
NT), with CONOPT2® as the solver (Brooke et al. 1998). As our model property we chose a 255 
hypothetical area in central Norway with 10.000 ha (100 km2) of grouse hunting terrain. Because we 256 
were not interested in any temporal effects in this study, the planning period was set to one year only. 257 
We took an adjusted scenario-based approach, running the model for a wide array of parameter values 258 
(Table 3), but focusing on one parameter at a time in order to deduct its individual effect. We started 259 
from a base scenario where parameters, to our best knowledge, resemble the most typically situation 260 
encountered in Scandinavia. From the base scenario we rescaled parameters up- and downwards to 261 
evaluate their effects on the model output. Our primary objective function was set to maximize the net 262 
profit stemming from grouse hunting on the property (equation 4).  263 
 264 
3. Results  265 
3.1. Hunter typologies 266 
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We identified three distinct hunter typologies: “The Experience Seeker”, “The Bag Oriented” and 267 
“The Northern Traditionalist”, who constituted 43, 32 and 25% of the respondents, respectively. 268 
Several variable sets gave a significant model fit (Wam et al. 2013). Here we use the model with the 269 
lowest classification error (3.8%) and the highest number of indicator variables. Demography, hunting 270 
habits and attitudes differed to various extents between the three typologies (Table 1). “The 271 
Experience Seeker” and “The Bag Oriented” were somewhat overrepresented by citizens from the 272 
southern region of the country, while “The Northern Traditionalist” was more frequent in the north. 273 
The latter typology had a lower income than the other two, but spent as much on grouse hunting 274 
related activities as the “The Bag Oriented”. However, a lesser part of it would potentially create 275 
direct income for grouse hunting properties (i.e. fees and accommodation). 276 
 277 
3.2. Hunter satisfaction (willingness-to-pay) 278 
The typologies valued a given bag size markedly different (Figure 1a-c). “The Experience Seeker” 279 
and “The Bag Oriented” had similar willingness-to-pay at low bag sizes, but strongly deviated for 280 
larger bag sizes. The willingness-to-pay for “The Experience Seeker” then declined, while for “The 281 
Bag Oriented” it increased. “The Northern Traditionalist” had a substantially lower willingness-to-pay 282 
than the other two typologies, and it was also the least affected by bag size. In contrast, the typologies 283 
were very much in agreement concerning crowding: raising the number of observed hunter groups 284 
from 0.06 to 0.48/day/km2 almost halved their willingness-to-pay (Figure 1d, typologies shown 285 
collectively because the difference between them was negligible).  286 
Combining the effects of bag size and crowding in the full price function (equations 5-7) produced 287 
curves that followed the shape of the crowding function, albeit with stronger differentiation between 288 
the hunter typologies. A higher bag size not only increased the differences in willingness-to-pay, but 289 
also changed the order of who was willing to pay the least or the most. Although the full price 290 
function spatially is of a higher dimension in the model, we present it here in the xy space to give a 291 
clearer view of the functional relationship between bag size and crowding (Fig. 2).  292 
 293 
3.3. Model optimization scenarios 294 
When optimizing the model for the base scenario (Table 3), the hunter density was kept close to the 295 
maximum allowed by the minimum daily bag size: 0.40 hunters per km2. The income generated per 296 
permit was then 1,656 NOK, while the overall profit for the 100 km2 sized property was 391 297 
NOK/km2. There were nine birds available to each hunter, or an average daily bag size of 0.60 birds 298 
(based on the hunters’ typical number of hunting days). Some factors had a stronger influence on the 299 
model outcome than others. We will address them in increasing order of importance: 300 
  301 
3.3.1. The effect of property size and running costs 302 
The size of the property as well as the fixed administrative costs naturally affected the overall profit, 303 
but singly had no bearing on the hunter densities and achieved bag sizes. If we adjusted the fixed 304 
administrative costs proportionally to the property size, their effect diminished completely. The hunter 305 
9 
 
densities were more strongly affected by the administrative cost per sold permit. Increasing this cost 306 
not only reduced the overall profit (e.g., raising the cost from 50 to 250 NOK lowered the overall 307 
profit from 391 to 312 NOK/km2), but also reduced the hunter density, as the drop in income per 308 
permit was partly counteracted by simultaneously reducing the crowding effect (hence, gaining a 309 
higher income per permit). However, the hunter density was not reduced until a certain threshold was 310 
passed, at which the cost increment exceeded the drop in income. Because the gain of having one less 311 
hunter was only about 30 NOK/permit (base scenario, varying with typology), this threshold was 312 
quite high (occurring at a permit cost of 603 NOK, base scenario). With a different hunting quota, the 313 
threshold shifted, as this also affected the gain per permit when adjusting the hunter density. 314 
 315 
3.3.2. The effect of hunting days, accommodation and bag size 316 
Increasing the number of hunting days per hunter had a negative effect on the hunter density, because 317 
fewer permits given the restriction of the minimum daily bag size. However, as each hunter then 318 
generated more income, the effect on the overall profit was positive, albeit not very large (an increase 319 
of, e.g., 50% more hunting days raised the profit from 391 to 444 NOK/km2).  320 
Altering the payment for accommodation had a more dynamic effect, as it changed not only the 321 
profit; the income per permit; and the hunter density, but also the daily bag sizes. The latter two were, 322 
however, only affected when the payment for accommodation was strongly reduced (>50% compared 323 
to the base scenario). For less strong reductions the potential income from accommodation (i.e. more 324 
hunters) was greater than the willingness-to-pay for a higher bag (i.e. fewer hunters), and so, the 325 
model kept the hunter density at the maximum allowed set by the minimum daily bag size.  326 
Altering the bag size directly by increasing the hunting quotas strongly influenced the hunter 327 
density, and thereby, also the profit. However, the income per permit was less affected, as the model 328 
increased the hunter density so that the daily bag size remained constant (for moderate quota 329 
alterations). Again there were threshold values, above which there was more to gain by rather 330 
reducing the hunter density (thereby obtaining a large daily bag size, and a high willingness-to-pay 331 
per permit).  332 
The minimum daily bag size was one of the most influential factors in the model. If omitted, the 333 
hunter density more than doubled (from 0.40 to 0.88 hunters per km2). The income per permit then 334 
dropped and its source shifted: more of it came from payment for accommodation (62-70%, 335 
depending on typology) rather than bagged birds. In the base scenario, accommodation contributed 336 
47-53% of the total income per permit. Conversely, if the minimum daily bag size was raised, the 337 
hunter density was correspondingly reduced (to, e.g., 0.10/km2 if given a bag limit of two birds per 338 
day, a typical situation in Norway). The hunters would then pay on average 270 NOK/day, which is 339 
substantially higher than in the base scenario (110 NOK/day), but still a little lower than what is the 340 
current market situation in Norway (302 NOK/day, Table 1). Selling less permits thus created a 341 
substantial gain in hunter satisfaction, as indicated by the income per permit. 342 
 343 
3.3.3. The effect of typology mixes and crowding 344 
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The income per permit for “The Bag Oriented” was 10% higher than for the “The Experience Seeker” 345 
and 31% higher than for the “The Northern Traditionalist”. Altering the proportional distribution of 346 
hunter typologies affected the daily bag size and the overall profit, but not the hunter density. Having 347 
100% “The Bag Oriented” generated an overall profit that was 17% higher than having 100% “The 348 
Experience Seeker” and 60% higher than having 100% “The Northern Traditionalist”.  349 
The effect of crowding had a strong influence on the hunter density. Reducing the observability 350 
factor made room for more hunters without lowering the hunters’ willingness-to-pay (fewer of the 351 
hunters would actually be seen by others). However, due to the minimum daily bag size, the hunter 352 
density was not affected other than for quite extreme values (the threshold being 83% observability in 353 
the base scenario). Consequently, observability had a rather weak effect on the income per permit 354 
(and the overall profit). For example, reducing it to 25% raised the income per permit from 1,656 to 355 
1,820 NOK, while increasing it to 75% made the income per permit drop to 1,452 NOK.  356 
 357 
4. Discussion 358 
In the optimization runs, the model generally kept the hunter densities at moderate to high levels, thus 359 
producing very low bag sizes and substantial crowding. Clearly, the potential in the hunters’ 360 
willingness-to-pay was not capitalized on; selling a high number of permits for a low price was more 361 
advantageous than selling fewer permits for a higher price. This particularly applied to “The Bag 362 
Oriented” and “The Northern Traditionalist”, who were willing to pay increasingly more for higher 363 
bag sizes. Leaving out the density dependent bag- and crowding effects altogether drove the hunter 364 
density towards its upper limit. While this simplified scenario void for social constructs produced a 365 
very high profit, it practically nullified hunter satisfaction. Very few, if any, grouse hunters would 366 
find it acceptable to obtain a daily bag size of <0.1 birds. Therefore, inclusion of social constructs in 367 
this study was not only beneficial, but even necessary in order to obtain a realistic model. 368 
 369 
4.1. Model framework 370 
Some may find our grouse population projection too simple because of its lack of temporal aspects. 371 
However, our model was not intended to function as an applied tool for determining hunting quotas. 372 
Like Sandercock et al. (2011), we strongly maintain that for grouse, quotas must be determined from 373 
bird counts conducted prior to the start of the hunting season. The annual variation in extrinsic factors 374 
influencing grouse production is too high to be sufficiently predicted by a model aimed at applied use. 375 
Complex demographic models may have great supplementing value to forecast what-if scenarios (e.g. 376 
Aanes et al. 2002), but the usefulness of coupling these with economic optimization is limited.  377 
Nevertheless, inclusion of season is a temporal aspect that could possibly be a valuable expansion 378 
of our model. Some parts of the hunting season are more favourable to grouse hunters than others: of 379 
the annual hunting days reported in our survey, 52% occurred in September, 29% in October, 11% in 380 
November-January and 8% in February-March. Likewise, the willingness-to-pay declined with 381 
season. The decline is likely caused by a combination of gradually fewer birds left to hunt; 382 
increasingly inclement weather; and fulfilment of the hunting desire. Skonhoft and Gudding (2010), 383 
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for example, included season in their bioeconomic model for ptarmigan hunting, with ‘days’ as the 384 
unit of time. Unfortunately, for our purpose of study we lack empirical data on the relationship 385 
between hunting effort and harvest, which we expect to vary with season (Kastdalen 1992; Hörnell-386 
Willebrand 2005). The inclusion of season must therefore be put on hold until someone establish 387 
reliable CPUE (catch per unit of effort) data for Scandinavian grouse hunting. 388 
 389 
4.2. Model parameterization 390 
Our model was parameterized from substantial and up-to-date empirical data. Still, our data has its 391 
share of weaker elements as well. One of these is the question of how many hunters in a given terrain 392 
are actually seen by each other. Hunters are not only separated in space, but also in time. As it turned 393 
out, though, our model was only marginally sensitive to the observability factor (ok), provided the 394 
minimum daily bag size (0.5 birds per hunter per day) was included. Because this bag size is rather 395 
low compared to what is normally obtained by Scandinavian ptarmigan hunters (e.g., 2.7 in Bröseth 396 
and Pedersen 2000; 1.0-4.1 in Hörnell-Willebrand 2005), a model scenario without it obviously is not 397 
realistic. Yet, in combination with high grouse productivity (larger quotas), the observability factor 398 
will have a key influence. This illustrates well why the aforementioned inclusion of season could be 399 
advantageous.  400 
All survey data asking respondents to evaluate imaginary situations are subject to deliberate or 401 
unintentional cognitive bias (Liljas and Blumenschein 2000). One traditional way to mitigate such 402 
bias is to repeat the same question with a different phrasing, which we did in our survey. While the 403 
actual gain from applying such follow-up questioning may be less than aspired (Herriges and Shogren 404 
1996), at least it serves to elucidate the scope of the bias. Our survey data had one noticeable 405 
discrepancy revealed by follow-up questioning: when asked directly at what bag sizes the willingness-406 
to-pay per bird would level out, the hunters stated an average of six birds per day. When asked how 407 
much they would pay per bird given various bag sizes, however, their prices still slightly increased (or 408 
decreased) when going from 8-10 to 15-20 birds. This also illustrates how question formulation may 409 
shape the response. By stipulating three levels of bag size, we made the respondents automatically 410 
consider the second alternative to be of intermediate value.  411 
Apparently, there is room for improvement in our formulation of questions if our sole purpose had 412 
been to establish the most realistic willingness-to-pay functions. One such improvement would be to 413 
include more than three bag size levels. We needed, however, to cover a broad range of topics 414 
(demography, habits and attitudes), and as respondent patience is limited, some lack of precision had 415 
to give. Accordingly, our willingness-to-pay data are best viewed as an index of relative hunter 416 
satisfaction rather than the actual price elasticity for Scandinavian grouse hunting. Assuming that 417 
willingness-to-pay reflects satisfaction is not without its pitfalls either, but this is an unavoidable 418 
inadequacy we have to accept when attempting to put monetary terms on people’s non-material 419 
preferences (Wam 2010).  420 
 421 
4.3. Applied relevance and conclusion 422 
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Our study has applied implications for the decision-making process of natural resource management. 423 
Typically, this process involves balancing the views and aspirations of multiple stakeholders and, in 424 
our case, even diverse segments within a stakeholder group. The number of alternative management 425 
strategies quickly rises in such settings, and it becomes difficult to determine a single best policy (e.g., 426 
Sainsbury et al. 2000; Mapstone et al. 2007). The use of management strategy evaluation methods 427 
(‘MSE’, Smith 1994) is therefore slowly driving the objectives of complex management away from 428 
‘optimality’ and towards ‘adequacy, robustness and feasibility’ (Bunnefeld et al. 2011a).   429 
The competing optimal strategies identified in our study confirm that this shift may be a good 430 
thing: optimizing one single quantitative measure such as net profit, and including a few nonmonetary 431 
restrictions such as adhering to the biological sustainable yield (‘MSY’), is not enough to keep game 432 
management sustainable. Frustrated hunters will most likely abandon hunting as an activity, or start 433 
overstepping rules and regulations. Inclusion of metrics of individual or social matter must therefore 434 
be given a key driving role in the modelling of sustainable game management (and its subsequent 435 
practical implementation). 436 
In conclusion; our study illustrates how biosocioeconomic modelling can be a valuable tool in the 437 
pursuit of sustainable game management. In the case of grouse hunting, it shows that the optimal 438 
course for the landowner may largely be at the expense of hunter satisfaction, even when the latter is 439 
positively related to the price obtained per sold permit. On a general note, this emphasizes the need to 440 
incorporate less traditional elements such as behavioural, psychological and social aspects into the 441 
more traditional bioeconomic modelling. 442 
443 
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Table 1. Demography, hunting habits and attitudes among three grouse hunter typologies in Norway 573 
(based on a survey conducted in 2010, N=3,293 respondents). Typologies were classified with latent 574 
class analysis (Latent GOLD®, cluster package). Note that the typologies may not significantly differ 575 
for all listed variables, and that not all significant variables are included here (* = part of the most 576 
parsimonious LCA model). NOK ≈ €0.125. 577 
578 
 
“The Experience 
Seeker” “The Bag Oriented” 
“The Northern 
Traditionalist” 
Percent of respondents 43% 32% 25% 
Place of living a 
Southern Norway 
Northern Norway 
 
61% 
39% 
 
60% 
40% 
 
45% 
55% 
Personal gross income (per year) 507’ NOK 498’ NOK 470’ NOK 
*Ptarmigan hunting days/year (current) 12.4 15.1 17.5 
Total hunting related  spending (per year) 
Spending on hunting permits (per day) 
Spending on accommodation (per day) 
10.550 NOK 
245 NOK 
89 NOK 
11.825 NOK 
250 NOK 
86 NOK 
11.692 NOK 
188 NOK 
65 NOK 
Crowding tolerance b 
If seeing 1-2  hunter groups/day  
If seeing 5-6  hunter groups/day 
If seeing 10+ hunter groups/day  
 
2.26 
3.41 (-51%) 
4.09 (-81%) 
 
2.37 
3.44 (-46%) 
4.04 (-70%) 
 
2.36 
3.38 (-43%) 
3.91 (-67%) 
Willingness-to-pay for a one week’s permit c 
If seeing  1-2 hunters (bag satisfying) 
If seeing 5-6 hunters (bag satisfying) 
If seeing  1-2 hunters (bag not satisfying) 
If seeing 5-6 hunters (bag not satisfying) 
 
2,045 NOK 
1,144 (-44%) 
1,426 NOK 
789 (-45%) 
 
2,020 NOK 
1,093 (-46%) 
1,259 NOK 
678 (-46%) 
 
1,810 NOK 
1,029 (-43%) 
1,240 NOK 
688 (-45%) 
*Willingness-to-pay per bagged bird d 
If bagging 1-3 birds/day 
If  bagging 8-10 birds/day 
If  bagging 15-20 birds/day 
 
90 NOK 
57 (-37%) 
40 (-56%) 
 
91 NOK 
118 (+30%) 
124 (+37%) 
 
58 NOK 
64 (+10%) 
67 (+16%) 
a Northern region = Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. Southern region = remaining counties. 
b 1-5 scale, where 1=acceptable and 5=not acceptable. Percentages refer to going from the lowest to the two higher densities. 
c Percentages refer to going from the lower to the higher hunter density for a given bag satisfaction. 
d Not including lodging etc. We omitted answers >300 NOK, as we presumed these were given per day not per bird (N=157). 
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Table 2. Model goodness-of-fit for estimated willingness-to-pay for ptarmigan hunting as a function 579 
of bag size and crowding, respectively, among three hunter typologies : “The Experienced Seeker” 580 
(ES), “The Bag Oriented” (BO) and “The Northern Traditionalist” (NT). Based on a survey conducted 581 
in Norway 2010 (N=3,293 respondents). 582 
 583 
 584 
Model Fdfe r
2 a p-value 
W
il
li
ng
ne
ss
-t
o-
pa
y 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 b
ag
 s
iz
e 
Linear model y = β1+β2·x 
ES: 99.6 – 3.52·x  
BO: 86.0 + 3.03·x 
NT: 59.0 + 0.51·x 
 
5982,868 
1841,177 
7.81,775 
 
0.172 
0.135 
0.004 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.005 
Second-order polynomial y = β1+β2·x+β3·x2 
ES: 112.6 – 7.92·x + 0.22·x2 
BO: 75.1 + 7.36·x – 0.28·x2 
NT: 57.8 + 0.91·x – 0.02·x2 
 
3282,867 
1061,176 
41,774 
 
0.186 
0.151 
0.004 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.018 
Michaelis Menten y = β1·x /(β1+x) 
ES: 45.3·x / (-1.07 +x) 
BO: 140·x / (1.17 +x) 
NT: 67.7·x / (0.28 +x) 
 
452,867 
11,176 
11,774 
 
0.175 
0.152 
0.006 
 
<0.001 
0.397 
0.419 
 W
il
li
ng
ne
ss
-t
o-
pa
y 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 c
ro
w
di
ng
 
Linear model y = β1+β2·x 
ES: 2,060-1,582·x 
BO: 2,009-1,548·x 
NT: 1,840-1,409·x 
 
7672,092 
4941,445 
3871,210 
 
0.268 
0.255 
0.242 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Second-order polynomial y = β1+β2·x+β3·x2 
ES: 2,208 – 2,705·x+ 1,022·x2 
BO: 2,173 – 2,805·x+ 1,144·x2 
NT: 1,961 – 2,333·x+ 840·x2 
 
4002,091 
2601,444 
2001,209 
 
0.276 
0.264 
0.248 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Sigmoid functiona y = β1/(1+ β2·x β3) 
ES: 2,093 / (1 +  4.3 ·x2.2) 
BO: 2,048 / (1 +  2.4 ·x1.4) 
NT: 1,833 / (1 +  2.2 ·x1.5) 
 
122,091 
51,444 
61,209 
 
0.276 
0.168 
0.171 
 
<0.001 
0.032 
0.015 
a Note that the r2 value may not be fully comparable between linear and nonlinear regression models (Cameron and Windmeijer 1997). 
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Table 3. Parameter sensitivity in a biosocioeconomic model for optimizing the number of ptarmigan 585 
hunting permits, with an objective function to maximize annual landowner profit. Only one parameter 586 
was re-scaled at a time. The numbers below shaded areas are the model output (same as those given in 587 
the last row). Based on a survey conducted in 2010 with N=3,293 respondents. 588 
 589 
590 
Parameter Base scenario Re-scaled scenarios 
  I II III IV 
Property size 100 km2 10 50 250 1,000 
  0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,657; -1,862 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 139 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,657; 539 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,657; 614 
fct (fixed administrative cost) 25,000 NOK 0 2,500 50,000 100,000 
  0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 639 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 614 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 139 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; -361 
hctk (costs added per permit) 50 NOK 0 25 250 1,000 
  0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 411 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 400 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,656; 312 
0.12; 29 (2.0); 
3,552; 59 
atkl (accommodation per day) see Table 1 0 -50% +100% +500% 
  0.39; 9 (0.6); 
906; 84 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,149; 189 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
2.679; 799 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
6,773; 2,437 
dtkl (number of days hunted) see Table 1 -75% -50% +50% +100% 
  0.36; 10 (2.7); 
1,004; 90 
0.66; 5 (0.7); 
758; 212 
0.27; 13 (0.7); 
2,660; 444 
0.20; 18 (0.6); 
3,632; 468 
qtk (total hunting quota) 3.5 birds/km
2 0.5 1.5 7.5 15.0 
  0.06; 9 (0.6); 
1,888; -143 
0.17; 9 (0.6); 
1,837; 57 
0.68; 11 (0.8); 
1,506; 735 
0.41; 36 (2.5); 
3,664; 1,241 
Minimum bag/hunter/day 0.50 0.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 
  0.88; 4 (0.28); 
927; 514 
0.20; 18 (1.2); 
2,519; 243 
0.10; 35 (2.4); 
4,056; 152 
0.04; 88 (6.0); 
8,452; 95 
ok (observability) 50% 0% 25% 75% 100% 
  0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,896; 487 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,820; 457 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,452; 310 
0.35; 10 (0.7); 
1,420; 228 
Density dependent effects  see Fig. 1 and 2 No bag effecta No bag/crowda No bag/crowdb  
  0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,661; 393 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,903; 489 
3.50; 1.0 (0.1); 
1,264; 3.976 
 
% hunter typologiesc see Table 1 100; 0; 0 0; 100; 0 0; 0; 100  
  0.40; 9 (0.7); 
1,668; 397 
0.40; 9 (0.6); 
1,839; 464 
0.40; 9 (0.5); 
1,402; 290 
 
Number of hunters/km2 
Bag size/hunter (per day) 
Gross income per permit 
Overall profit per km2 
0.40 
9 (0.6) 
1,656 NOK 
391 NOK 
    
a Assuming a fixed willingness-to-pay per bird, not varying with bag size, and equalling the one stated for 1-3 birds/day (see Table 1). 
b As for footnotea, but in addition, leaving out the lower limit on daily bag size. 
c “The Experience Seeker”,” The Bag Oriented” and “The Northern Traditionalist”, respectively. 
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Figure 1a-d. Willingness-to-pay for (a-c) a bagged ptarmigan given various yields, or (d) a week’s 591 
hunting given various levels of crowding, among different typologies of Norwegian grouse hunters. 592 
Based on a survey conducted in 2010 with N=3,293 respondents. 593 
 594 
Figure 2. Norwegian grouse hunters’ total willingness-to-pay for their normal number of ptarmigan 595 
hunting days throughout the season in relation to crowding, given they obtain (a) low yields (1 596 
ptarmigan/day); and (b) higher yields (5 ptarmigans/day), and assuming an hunter observability of 597 
25% (i.e. every fourth hunter is actually seen by others). Based on a survey conducted in 2010 with 598 
N=3,293 respondents. 599 
600 
21 
 
• We present a biosocioeconomic model targeted at grouse hunting management.  601 
• Omitting social constructs from the model multiplied landowner profit...  602 
• …but practically nullified hunter satisfaction.  603 
• Integrated multidisciplinary models are needed to keep game management sustainable. 604 
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